India Since Independence Page 3
This high quality of leadership was not confined only to the Congress party . The conservative Swatantra Party was headed by C. Raj agopalachari, the dissident Congressm en by J.B. Kripalani, the Hindu com m unalists by Sy am a Prasad Mookerj ee, the non-Congress dalits by B.R.
Am bedkar, the Socialists by Achary a Narendra Dev and Jay aprakash Naray an, and the Com m unists by P.C. Joshi, Aj oy Ghosh and E.M.S. Nam boodiripad.
In contrast, it can be asserted that a serious problem in the past few decades has been the paucity of political leaders with the qualities and skills of the founders of the Republic. Indira Gandhi did possess som e of their qualities. But after her and even during the period that she dom inated—and perhaps to som e extent because of it—a gradual decline occurred in the stature of leadership, with few having wide appeal or acceptability or the larger vision. Most political leaders increasingly appealed to a region or a religion or a caste, or a conglom erate of castes.
The outcom e of this has been that while m any Indians have looked for wider, all-India leadership to the descendants of Nehru and Indira Gandhi, others have given allegiance to leaders and parties following populist or opportunist or com m unal and casteist politics.
Our Approach
This work is the story of a people on the m ove, of a ‘gradual revolution’, of the efforts of the Indian people to realize the vision of the freedom struggle. For us writers it has also been a j ourney into our personal past, involving an effort at cool and dispassionate analy sis though, perhaps, failing at tim es to avoid the passion which inform s all those who are deeply involved in the effort to raise the social conditions of their people, and the biases acquired when living through the events. As readers will see, we have adopted a critical approach to our recent past and contem porary events but within a broadly optim istic fram ework.
The y ear 1947 ushered in a period of change and developm ent. Inevitably , new problem s, often engendered by the change itself, were added to the old ones, requiring fresh solutions. The questions needing to be addressed were of the nature of the problem s and how, when and with what consequences they were tackled. After all, had not Gandhij i predicted on the eve of independence that ‘with the end of slavery and the dawn of freedom , all the weaknesses of society are bound to com e to the surface’. He, however, also saw ‘no reason to be unnecessarily upset about it. If we keep our balance at such a tim e, every tangle will be solved.’4 Historians will have to evaluate in the com ing y ears, how far the aspirations aroused by the freedom struggle’s legacy , in term s of national unity , dem ocracy , secularism , independent econom ic developm ent, equality , and rem oval of poverty , have been fulfilled in a substantive m anner.
In the early y ears, during m uch of the Nehru era, there was an air of optim ism and a sense of achievem ent. This was reflected in Nehru’s letter to the chief m inisters, written with self-confidence and satisfaction j ust after watching the Republic Day parade at Delhi in 1955: ‘My heart was filled with pride and j oy at this sight of our nation on the m arch realising its goals one by one. There was a sense of fulfilm ent in the air and of confidence in our future destiny .’5 And he repeated a few m onths later: ‘There is the breath of the dawn, the feeling of the beginning of a new era in the long and chequered history of India. I feel so and in this m atter at least I think I represent innum erable others in our country .’6 And what m ade Nehru so optim istic? To quote Nehru’s biographer, S. Gopal: ‘Individual freedom , social j ustice, popular participation, planned developm ent, national self-reliance, a posture of self-respect in international affairs—all high and noble goals, y et all being steadily achieved under the guidance of the prim e m inister . . .’7
It is true that Nehru and the generation that witnessed the com ing of independence had hoped for far m ore progress than the country was able to m ake. Still, the people and the intelligentsia rem ained optim istic, not only during the Nehru era but even under Indira Gandhi, at least till 1973–1974. But gradually the euphoria and the self-confidence, the enthusiasm and the pride in achievem ent began to disappear and give way to frustration, cy nicism and a sense of despair.
Yet, as this work will bring out, while m uch m ore was needed and could have been achieved, but was not, especially in term s of the quality of life of the people (and which would j ustify a great deal of criticism and even despair), there was considerable gain. Our hopes and confidence in the future of the country and its people is j ustified by this achievem ent.
We believe what Verrier Elwin, the British scholar-m issionary who m ade India his hom e and took up its citizenship, wrote in 1963 largely expresses our views and sentim ents: ‘All the sam e I am incurably optim istic about India. Her angry y oung m en and disillusioned old m en are full of criticism and resentm ent. It is true that there is som e corruption and a good deal of inefficiency ; there is hy pocrisy , too m uch of it. But how m uch there is on the credit side! It is a thrilling experience to be part of a nation that is try ing, against enorm ous odds, to reshape itself.’8
Perhaps the attitude for us to take towards our m any failures is the one adopted by Gopal Krishna Gokhale towards those of the Moderate nationalists:
Let us not forget that we are at a stage of the country ’s progress when our achievem ents are bound to be sm all, and our disappointm ents frequent and try ing.
That is the place which it has pleased Providence to assign to us in this struggle, and our responsibility is ended when we have done the work which belongs to that place.
It will, no doubt, be given to our country m en of future generations to serve India by their successes; we, of the present generation, m ust be content to serve her m ainly by our failures. For, hard though it be, out of those failures the strength will com e which in the end will accom plish great tasks. 9
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The Colonial Legacy
India’s colonial past has weighed heavily on her developm ent since 1947. In the econom ic sphere, as in others, British rule drastically transform ed India. But the changes that took place led only to what has been aptly described by A. Gunder Frank as the ‘developm ent of underdevelopm ent’. These changes—in agriculture, industry , transport and com m unication, finance, adm inistration, education, and so on—were in them selves often positive, as for exam ple the developm ent of the railway s. But operating within and as part of the colonial fram ework, they becam e inseparable from the process of underdevelopm ent. Further, they led to the cry stallization of the colonial econom ic structure which generated poverty and dependence on and subordination to Britain.
Basic Features
There were four basic features of the colonial structure in India. First, colonialism led to the com plete but com plex integration of India’s econom y with the world capitalist sy stem but in a subservient position. Since the 1750s, India’s econom ic interests were wholly subordinated to those of Britain. This is a crucial aspect, for integration with the world econom y was inevitable and was a characteristic also of independent econom ies.
Second, to suit British industry , a peculiar structure of production and international division of labour was forced upon India. It produced and exported foodstuffs and raw m aterials—cotton, j ute, oilseeds, m inerals—and im ported m anufactured products of British industry from biscuits and shoes to m achinery , cars and railway engines.
This feature of colonialism continued even when India developed a few labour-intensive industries such as j ute and cotton textiles. This was because of the existing peculiar pattern of international division of labour by which Britain produced high technology , high productivity and capital-intensive goods while India did the opposite. The pattern of India’s foreign trade was an indication of the econom y ’s colonial character. As late as 1935–39, food, drink, tobacco and raw m aterials constituted 68.5 per cent of India’s exports while m anufactured goods were 64.4 per cent of her im ports.
Third, basic to the process of econom ic developm ent is the size and utilizatio
n of the econom ic surplus or savings generated in the econom y for investm ent and therefore expansion of the econom y . The net savings in the Indian econom y from 1914 to 1946 was only 2.75 per cent of Gross National Product (GNP) (i.e., national incom e). The sm all size m ay be contrasted with the net savings in 1971–75 when they constituted 12 per cent of GNP. The paltry total capital form ation, 6.75 per cent of GNP during 1914–46 as against 20.14 per cent of GNP during 1971– 75, reflects this j um p. Moreover, the share of industry in this low level of capital form ation was aby sm ally low, m achinery form ing only 1.78 per cent of GNP during 1914–46. (This figure was 6.53 for 1971–75.)
Furtherm ore, a large part of India’s social surplus or savings was appropriated by the colonial state and m isspent. Another large part was appropriated by the indigenous landlords and m oney lenders. It has been calculated that by the end of the colonial period, the rent and interest paid by the peasantry am ounted to Rs 1,400 m illion per y ear. By 1937, the total rural debt am ounted to Rs 18,000 m illion. According to another estim ate, princes, landlords and other interm ediaries appropriated nearly 20 per cent of the national incom e. Only a very sm all part of this large surplus was invested in the developm ent of agriculture and industry . Most of it was squandered on conspicuous consum ption or used for further intensify ing landlordism and usury .
Then there was the ‘Drain’, that is, the unilateral transfer to Britain of social surplus and potential investable capital by the colonial state and its officials and foreign m erchants through excess of exports over im ports. India got back no equivalent econom ic, com m ercial or m aterial returns for it in any form . It has been estim ated that 5 to 10 per cent of the total national incom e of India was thus unilaterally exported out of the country . How could any country develop while undergoing such a drain of its financial resources and potential capital?
The fourth feature of colonialism in India was the crucial role play ed by the state in constructing, determ ining and m aintaining other aspects of the colonial structure. India’s policies were determ ined in Britain and in the interests of the British econom y and the British capitalist class. An im portant aspect of the underdevelopm ent of India was the denial of state support to industry and agriculture. This was contrary to what happened in nearly all the capitalist countries, including Britain, which enj oy ed active state support in the early stages of developm ent. The colonial state im posed free trade in India and refused to give tariff protection to Indian industries as Britain, western Europe and the United States had done.
After 1918, under the pressure of the national m ovem ent, the Governm ent of India was forced to grant som e tariff protection to a few industries. But this was inadequate and ineffective.
Moreover, since the 1880s, the currency policy was m anipulated by the governm ent to favour British industry and which was to the detrim ent of Indian industry .
As pointed out earlier, a very large part of India’s social surplus was appropriated by the colonial state, but a very sm all part of it was spent by it on the developm ent of agriculture or industry or on social infrastructure or nation-building activities such education, sanitation and health services.
The colonial state devoted alm ost its entire incom e to m eeting the needs of British Indian adm inistration, m aking pay m ents of direct and indirect tribute to Britain and in serving the needs of British trade and industry . The bulk of public revenue was absorbed by m ilitary expenditure and civil adm inistration which was geared to m aintenance of law and order and tax collection.
After 1890, m ilitary expenditure absorbed nearly 50 per cent of the central governm ent’s incom e. In 1947–48, this figure stood at nearly 47 per cent.
Besides, the Indian tax structure was highly inequitable. While the peasants were burdened with pay ing a heavy land revenue for m ost of the colonial period and the poor with the salt tax etc., the upper-incom e groups—highly paid bureaucrats, landlords, m erchants and traders—paid hardly any taxes. The level of direct taxes was quite low. The num ber of incom e-tax pay ers was 360,000 in 1946–47. It was under the pressure from the national and peasant m ovem ents that the land revenue and salt tax started com ing down in the twentieth century . As late as 1900–01 land revenue and salt tax form ed 53 per cent and 16 per cent of the total tax revenue of the governm ent.
Economic Backwardness
Colonialism becam e a fetter on India’s agricultural and industrial developm ent. Agriculture stagnated in m ost parts of the country and even deteriorated over the y ears, resulting in extrem ely low y ields per acre, and som etim es even reaching zero. There was a decline in per capita agricultural production which fell by 14 per cent between 1901 and 1941. The fall in per capita foodgrains was even greater, being over 24 per cent.
Over the y ears, an agrarian structure evolved which was dom inated by landlords, m oney lenders, m erchants and the colonial state. Subinfeudation, tenancy and sharecropping increasingly dom inated both the zam indari and ry otwari areas. By the 1940s, the landlords controlled over 70 per cent of the land and along with the m oney lenders and the colonial state appropriated m ore than half of the total agricultural production.
The colonial state’s interest in agriculture was prim arily confined to collecting land revenue and it spent very little on im proving agriculture. Sim ilarly , landlords and m oney lenders found rack-renting of tenants and sharecroppers and usury far m ore profitable and safe than m aking productive investm ent in the land they owned or controlled. All this was hardly conducive to agricultural developm ent.
In m any areas, a class of rich peasants developed as a result of com m ercialization and tenancy legislation, but m ost of them too preferred to buy land and becom e landlords or to turn to m oney lending. As a result capitalist farm ing was slow to develop except in a few pockets. On the other hand, im poverished cultivators, m ost of them sm all peasants, tenants-at-will and sharecroppers, had no resources or incentive to invest in the im provem ent of agriculture by using better cattle and seeds, m ore m anure and fertilizers and im proved techniques of production. For m ost of the colonial period, landlessness had been rising, so that the num ber of landless agricultural labourers grew from 13 per cent of the agricultural population in 1871 to 28 per cent in 1951. The increase in tenant farm ing and sharecropping and overcrowding of agriculture was followed by an extrem e subdivision of land into sm all holdings and fragm entation. Further, these holdings were scattered into non-contiguous parcels which led to cultivation becom ing uneconom ic and incapable of m aintaining the cultivator even at a subsistence level.
Of course, the linkage with the world m arket and developm ent of roads and railway s did lead to a large part of rural produce entering the urban and world m arkets and to the production of com m ercial crops. However, com m ercialization of agriculture did not lead to capitalist farm ing or im proved technology . Its chief result was that better soil, available water and other resources were diverted from food crops to com m ercial crops.
At a tim e when agriculture in the developed countries was being m odernized and revolutionized, there was a near absence of change in the technological and production base of Indian agriculture. Indian peasants continued to use the prim itive im plem ents they had used for centuries. For exam ple, in 1951, there were only 930,000 iron ploughs in use while wooden ploughs num bered 31.3 m illion. The use of inorganic fertilizers was virtually unknown, while a large part of anim al m anure—cow dung, night soil and cattle bones—was wasted. In 1938–39, only 11 per cent of all cropped land was under im proved seeds, their use being largely confined to non-food cash crops.
Agricultural education was com pletely neglected. In 1946, there were only nine agricultural colleges with 3,110 students. There was hardly any investm ent in terracing, flood-control, drainage, or desalination of soil. Irrigation was the only field in which som e progress was m ade so that by the 1940s nearly 27 per cent of the total cultivated area was irrigated. But, then, India had alway s been
quite advanced in irrigation cultivation.
Another central aspect of India’s econom ic backwardness was the state of its industry . During the nineteenth century , there was a quick collapse of Indian handicraft and artisanal industries largely because of the com petition from the cheaper im ported m anufactures from Britain together with the policy of free trade im posed on India. The ruined artisans failed to find alternative em ploy m ent. The only choice open to them was to crowd into agriculture as tenants, sharecroppers and agricultural labourers.
Modern industries did develop in India from the second half of the nineteenth century . But, both in term s of production and em ploy m ent, the level of industrial developm ent was stunted and paltry com pared with that of the developed countries. It did not com pensate even for the handicraft industries it displaced. Industrial developm ent was m ainly confined to cotton, j ute and tea in the nineteenth century and to sugar, cem ent and paper in the 1930s. There had been som e developm ent of the iron and steel industry after 1907, but as late as 1946, cotton and j ute textiles accounted for nearly 30 per cent of all workers em ploy ed in factories and m ore than 55 per cent of the total value added by m anufacturing. The share of m odern industries in national incom e at the end of British rule was only 7.5 per cent. India also lagged in the developm ent of electric power. Sim ilarly , m odern banking and insurance were grossly underdeveloped.
An im portant index of India’s industrial backwardness and econom ic dependence on the m etropolis was the virtual absence of capital goods and m achine industries. In 1950, India m et about 90 per cent of its needs of m achine tools through im ports. The underdeveloped character of this m odern part of the econom y can be seen by com paring certain econom ic statistics for 1950
and 1984 (the figures for 1984 are given within brackets). In 1950 India produced 1.04 m illion tons of steel (6.9 m illion tons), 32.8 m illion tons of coal (155.2 m illion tons), 2.7 m illion tons of cem ent (29.9 m illion tons), Rs. 3 m illion worth of m achine tools and portable tools (Rs. 3.28